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Abstract: 
There is widespread disagreement about how to understand musical improvisation in 
the current literature. My paper is motivated by the desire to settle this disagreement. 
I do this, in part, by emphasizing the important role action descriptions play in 
classifying specific actions as specific action-types, like improvised or intentional. In 
order to further settle the disagreement over the nature of musical improvisation, I 
defend a general account of improvisation, which can also aid in understanding a 
wide variety of specific types of improvisation. According to my general account, an 
improvised action is any unplanned and novel action performed by an agent within a 
predetermined improvisational framework. This definition helps make sense of the 
disagreement over the nature of musical improvisation, provides clarity for empirical 
project studying the neural correlates of improvised action and more generally helps 
us separate improvised action from other types of action, like planned or deliberate 
action, and also random action. 
 
Introduction 
 
There is limited discussion of improvisation in contemporary analytic philosophy. 
Though improvisation seems to be a type of action, few philosophers of action have 
written on the subject. Most of what has been written on the subject has come from 
aestheticians, and focuses primarily on musical improvisation. A large bulk of the 
serious philosophical work on improvisation appears in two issues of the Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism. A special issue of that journal was dedicated to 
improvisation in 2000, and more recently, in 2010, the journal hosted a symposium 
on the subject. In addition to aesthetics, some cognitive neuroscientists studying 
creativity and improvisation in jazz music and hip-hop have waded into philosophical 
territory in their discussions of their empirical findings (see Limb & Braun 2008, 
Ellamil et al. 2012, Liu et al. 2012). In all of this literature very little is said about 
improvisation in general as a type of action. In the absence of a general account of 
improvised action there is little consensus about how we should understand musical 
improvisation and other specific types of improvised action. Likewise, it’s not clear 
how to best understand the results of experiments that seek to understand the neural 
correlates of improvised action. The general account of improvised action offered in 
this paper hopes to help settle some of confusion surrounding these issues. 
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The paper will begin by looking at one of the disagreements folks are having 
about a particular kind of improvised action, namely, the ongoing debate about how 
to understand musical improvisation. Most of the authors working on musical 
improvisation are quick to point out a distinction between ‘improvisation’ in the 
product sense, used to discuss the musical piece that is created, and ‘improvisation’ 
in the action sense, used to discuss the action that creates the musical piece (see 
Alperson, 1984). So, for example we can talk about Miles Davis’s improvisation in 
terms of his action, or Miles Davis’s improvisation in terms of his song. The sense I 
am most interested in is the action sense. I will confine my talk to this sense of the 
word, except where otherwise noted. As Philip Alperson, one of the leading scholars 
working on improvisation, points out, there is sure to be some close connection 
between improvised actions and the products such actions produce (1984). With that 
being said, I do not intend to explore this connection in very much depth at this time. 
Alperson describes the action sense of musical improvisation as “an activity 
of spontaneous music-making in which the improviser somehow practices 
simultaneously the interdependent functions of composition and performance” 
(1984). Carol S. Gould and Kenneth Keaton oppose Alperson’s view of 
improvisation, arguing, “improvisation is conceptually independent of spontaneity” 
(2000). They maintain that a performance of a piece of classical music, composed 
prior to performance, nevertheless still involves a degree of improvisation. Gould and 
Keaton point out that no matter how much detail a composer puts into a musical 
score, there will always be unspecified musical elements that the performer will have 
to improvise during the course of every performance. Alperson acknowledges these 
unplanned aspects of music playing, but says they amount to the interpretation of a 
piece, rather than the improvisation of one.  
Gould and Keaton’s project can be seen as an attempt to dissolve the 
distinction between improvisation and interpretation as it’s commonly discussed in 
the literature. By taking this position Gould and Keaton also confront the popular idea 
that jazz and classical music can be distinguished in part by observing that playing 
jazz is an improvised activity while playing classical music is an interpretive activity. 
On Gould and Keaton’s view, improvisation is an essential feature of every musical 
performance. On Alperson’s view improvisation refers only to the spontaneous 
creation of new musical sequences, as in jazz.  
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In neuroscience, there is slightly more agreement about how to understand 
improvisation. However, the definition everyone agrees on is a bit obscure. Charles 
Limb is one of the leading neuroscientists studying the neural correlates of 
improvised action and creativity. In a study published in 2008, Limb put several jazz 
musicians into an fMRI scanner and had them improvise on a magnetically safe MIDI 
keyboard over a prerecorded track. In his discussion of his findings, Limb puts forth a 
brief definition of the object of his study. He says his study is about the neural 
correlates of ‘spontaneous musical performance’, which he defines as “immediate, 
on-line improvisation of novel melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic musical elements 
within a relevant musical context” (2008). The definition looks a bit like Alperson’s. 
Instead of defining ‘improvisation’ in terms of ‘spontaneity’ though, he defines 
‘spontaneity’ in terms of ‘improvisation’. This is frustrating because, at this point, it is 
unclear how ‘spontaneous performance’ is supposed to tell us anything about 
‘improvisation’ or vice versa. Simply equating ‘spontaneous performance’ with 
‘improvisation’ does not seem to give us the information we need to understand the 
meaning of the phrase. Although Limb does not seem to be giving a thoroughgoing 
analysis of the concept of improvisation, such an analysis might lead to a better 
explanation of the data collected by Limb and his colleagues. So it seems like a great 
deal of a wide range of scholarly work on improvisation could benefit from having a 
well-defined general account of improvised action.  
In this paper, I will propose a general account of improvisation, one that can 
help adjudicate disagreements about the nature of musical improvisation, as well as 
provide clarity to empirical projects seeking to understand the neural correlates of 
improvisation. I suggest a new definition of improvisation along the following lines – 
an improvised action is any unplanned and novel action performed by an agent 
within a properly defined improvisational framework. My hope is that in addition to 
clarifying the confusions and disagreements I’ve just mentioned this definition will 
also help distinguish improvisation in general from other kinds of action. The 
suggestion here is that by knowing what improvised actions are, we should be able 
to distinguish them from actions that are not improvised, like planned, deliberate, 
random or reflexive actions. My account will hopefully set improvisation apart from 
these other kinds of actions. 
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One final idea I want to advocate in this paper is that although improvisation 
is often discussed in terms of performance art, it is possible to think about 
improvisation in a wider context, as an essential component of our day-to-day 
activities. Thinking about improvisation in this way provides an even stronger 
motivation for the present study. Consider the following examples of improvisation—
when we have a surprise encounter at the market with a friend, we improvise our 
way through some small talk, not having time to plan out any of the things we end up 
saying. When we realize the IKEA bed didn’t come with all of its screws, we 
improvise solutions. When we obtain a new piece of complicated technology, we 
may toss the user manual aside and improvise with it as we learn how to properly 
use it. It might even be argued that we improvise our way through close 
relationships, marriages and child rearing. There are more obvious examples 
available to us, like dancing, being witty at a dinner party, running a seminar, playing 
fast-paced sports like basketball, hockey or ping-pong, etc. These are all examples 
of activities that I hope everyone agrees involve a great deal of improvisation.  
My plan for the rest of the paper is as follows: before defending my general 
account of improvisation I first want to discuss the disagreement between Alperson 
and his critics in more depth. A discussion of how to adjudicate this disagreement will 
follow. In short, on my analysis, the disagreement arises between Alperson and his 
critics because they are not careful enough with how they describe the actions they 
are trying to classify as improvised. They are prone to vague assertions like ‘jazz is 
improvised and classical music isn’t’. On my view, there are aspects of both jazz and 
classical music performances that count as improvised actions, and other aspects of 
each that do not count as improvised actions. When we are careful about how we 
describe the actions involved in playing classical or jazz music, determining which of 
them are improvised and which are not becomes a relatively straightforward affair. 
Following the discussion of Alperson and his critics will be a more in-depth 
discussion of my positive account of improvised action. My account consists of four 
parts that I will discuss in turn. First I will discuss why improvisations must be 
unplanned. Second I will discuss why improvisations must be novel. Third I will 
discuss why improvisations must be performed within a particular framework. Finally, 
I will conclude by saying something about the role of agency in improvisation. Keep 
in mind that even though most of my discussion focuses on musical improvisation, it 
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is supposed to be an analysis of improvised action in general. Therefore, anything I 
say about the structure of musical improvisation should also be applicable to the 
variety of day-to-day improvised actions previously mentioned. When possible I will 
use examples to make this point explicit. Now we proceed to the debate between 
Alperson and his critics over the nature of musical improvisation. 
Musical Improvisation  
Alperson’s view of improvisation relies on an understanding of the difference 
between composition and performance. Alperson defines composition as “that 
creative act of conceiving of and organizing the parts or elements which make up the 
pattern or design of the musical whole” (1984). He defines performance as “that 
executory activity by means of which a musical composition is then rendered into a 
sequence of sounds” (1984). According to Alperson, the “conventional” state of 
affairs in music is a two-stage process, whereby a composer composes a piece of 
music that at some later time is performed by some performer, who may or may not 
be the same person as the composer. What is unique about improvised action is that 
it involves collapsing these two processes into one activity. On Alperson’s view, 
when a musician improvises she simultaneously becomes the composer and the 
performer of a new piece of music.1  
 Alperson discusses the ontology of improvised performances in terms of the 
type/token distinction. Following Joseph Margolis’s version of the type/token 
distinction, Alperson describes a ‘type’ as an abstract particular that can be 
instantiated. Tokens are instantiations of types. For example, a sculptor might create 
a wooden statue. This statue would be a token of a type. Copies of the statue might 
be cast in bronze and each one of these along with the original wooden piece would 
be tokens of the abstract type. Alperson, following Margolis and Kant, adds to this 
familiar framework the concept of a ‘megatype’. I take megatypes to be something 
like a ‘fuzzy-type’, capable of acting as a type for a limited variety of slightly different 
tokens2. So consider the megatype of “Johnny B. Goode”. Chuck Berry’s version, 
                                                
1 This parallels Bill Evans’ famous comment that musical improvisation is the process of 
‘composing one minute’s music in one minute’s time’. 
2 Thanks to Brit Brogaard for pointing out that there may be some similarities here to 
prototype theory, or Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblances. The different 
performances of “Johnny B. Goode” I mentioned share enough similarities they can be said 
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Jimi Hendrix’s version and the Rolling Stones’ version are all tokens of this 
megatype, even though these versions sound very different from each other. So 
Alperson wants to know, how do cases of improvised music function in terms of this 
framework? Is an act of musical improvisation an instantiation of some already 
existing megatype? Or could it be the generation of some new megatype? 
 Central to Alperson’s view is the claim that an improviser composes a new 
song just as she or he performs it, so it cannot be that an improvised performance 
instantiates an already existing megatype. Further, on Alperson’s view, an 
improvised musical performance does not involve the creation of a new megatype 
either. This is because megatypes are supposed to admit a number of instantiations, 
and improvised songs do not do this. Alperson claims that it is highly unlikely that 
improvised performances would be exactly replicated in all “the musically relevant 
ways” (1984). Gould and Keaton point out the weakness of this part of Alperson’s 
argument, as it seems to rest on probabilistic concerns, rather than on logical 
necessity (2000). While this seems like a valid criticism, I want to table it and finish 
presenting Alperson’s view.  
Alperson notes that recordings are very often made of improvised 
performances. One might be tempted to think that since these recordings can be 
used as a reference point for reproductions of the work, a megatype really is being 
created during an improvisation. In response to this Alperson writes, “However, such 
cases [i.e. recordings] would stand to the originals as copies of paintings stand to 
their originals, i.e., as tokens of a megatype, only if one thinks of improvisations as 
musical structures or designs” (1984). Alperson thinks we should not think of 
improvisations in terms of the musical structures or designs produced, i.e. in the 
product sense. Instead we should think of improvisation in terms of the action 
undertaken, i.e. in the action sense. On this view, it would be inappropriate to think of 
a recording as a token instance of an improvisation. Instead, he writes, “what we 
                                                
to be tied together to the extent to which they resemble a prototypical version of ‘Johnny B. 
Goode”, or because they are all similar enough to obviously belong to the same ‘family’, i.e. 
the family of songs rightly called “Johnny B. Goode”. In keeping with the literature I’m dealing 
with, I plan to keep talking about megatypes, rather than prototypes or families. It seems as 
though megatype could be exchanged with one of these other terms without much trouble. 
Readers are invited to think about megatypes in terms of prototypes or families, if they so 
chose. 
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have is a record of a (unique) action” (1984). The megatype for an improvisation in 
the action sense would have to an abstraction of the actions that count as the 
performance, not an abstraction of the sounds produced by that performance. So if 
you transcribed and learned to play the notes on a recording of an improvised 
performance, your performance would not count as an instantiation of the original 
improvisation. This is because your performance would be missing one of the 
essential features of the original improvisation, namely that it was produced 
spontaneously rather than being played off of a score. The only way to faithfully 
reproduce an improvisation would be if some musician somehow happened to 
spontaneously replay the same notes played by the original improviser. The 
performance would have to be the same ‘in all the musically relevant way’–a highly 
unlikely occurrence, given the sheer range of possibilities afforded to players of 
improvised music. 
Gould and Keaton have criticized Alperson’s view of improvisation, which 
strongly contrasts improvisation with what he calls the ‘conventional’ state of affairs 
in classical music. Gould and Keaton think performances of classical music do not 
differ in the extreme way Alperson suggests. They do agree that there are important 
difference between jazz and classical music, but they argue jazz and classical music 
“differ more in degree than in kind” (2000). On their view, improvisation arises from 
“a relation between the score and the performance event” (2000). They argue that, 
just like a jazz musician, “a classical performer interpreting a work produces a unique 
sound event and does so with an element of spontaneity”(2000). For example, they 
write, “While melodies and harmonies may be specified in advance, the precise 
realization of dynamics, rhythmic subtleties, timbre, intonation, and articulation arises 
at the moment of the performance and will vary (often considerably) from 
performance to performance, even when the piece is played by the same musician” 
(pg. 145). Typically these subtle aspects of playing music are not included in the 
composition. Deciding how to play these aspects is left up to the performer.  
On Gould and Keaton’s view there is no real difference between what a jazz 
musician does and what a classical musician does. They argue that the one should 
be able to give the same analysis of the type/token distinction for classical music as 
Alperson gives for jazz music. That is, it is highly unlikely that a musician could ever 
faithfully reproduce a performance of a piece of classical music, due to all the subtle 
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and improvised differences players add to the composition during their 
performances. Gould and Keaton agree that the improvised solos of jazz allow for a 
wider degree of improvised action, but they maintain that the wide degree of 
improvisation available to a jazz musician does not make what she or he does 
essentially different from what a classical musician does. Both involve improvising 
certain aspects of the composition.  
So what is the source of the disagreement between Gould and Keaton and 
Alperson, and what should be done about it? As previously mentioned, I think that 
the source of this disagreement is a result of the way the actions in question are 
described. In both of these opposing views, one finds talk about ‘playing jazz’ and 
‘playing classical music’. Talking about improvisation at this level of description is not 
likely to allow us to say anything of real interest with respect to improvisation. These 
descriptions are so general that they cannot be rightly be classified as essentially 
improvised or not. We need to examine finer grained descriptions of actions if we are 
to make such classifications. Lower level descriptions are more easily classified as 
being or not being improvised, as we will see. 
In what follows I will show how being careful about action descriptions when 
classifying them as improvised or not can help settle the debate between Alperson 
and his critics. After my attempt to settle the debate about the nature of musical 
improvisation, I will defend the following general account of improvised action: an 
improvised action is any unplanned and novel action performed by an agent within a 
properly defined improvisational framework. I repeat this definition now because it 
will be useful to keep it in mind while I work on the problem at hand.  
Response to Alperson and his Critics  
In order to press the importance of being careful about our descriptions when 
attempting to classify specific actions as specific action types, I want to reference the 
work of G.E.M. Anscombe, one of the founders of contemporary philosophy of 
action. Donald Davidson called her 1957 book Intention, “the most important 
treatment of action since Aristotle”. Some of what Anscombe says about intentional 
actions can be roughly translated to apply to improvised actions as well. Anscombe 
argues that actions are intentional on some levels of description but not on others 
(1957). Similarly, I think actions are improvised on some levels of description but not 
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on others. Before we apply this Anscombian idea to improvised actions, we should 
first take note of how it gets set up for intentional actions. 
Consider Anscombe’s famous example of a man pumping water into the 
cistern of a house (1957). This person has plans to murder the people in the house 
with a poison she has somehow planted in the water supply. Anscombe considers a 
wide range of descriptions of this action. Some of the descriptions are of intentional 
actions, and some of them are not. For example, the person in the example is 
intentionally pumping her arm. She is intentionally refilling the house’s water supply. 
She is also intentionally poisoning the inhabitants of the house. It would be wrong, 
however, to say that she is intentionally contracting [such-and-such] muscles, even 
though this is a description of the same action I just described at various other levels. 
Contracting [such-and-such] muscles is not a description of an improvised action 
because it does not satisfy Anscombe’s requirement that a person must be non-
observationally aware of what they are intentionally doing.  
The basic claim here is if someone asks you ‘why you are pumping your 
arm?’ and you look, startle, and exclaim ‘oh my, I hadn’t noticed that my arm was 
pumping’, then pumping your arm is not a description of an intentional action. Or, if 
you are nervously bouncing your leg during the final moments of a long seminar, 
someone might become annoyed and ask you to stop. Not realizing you were doing 
this until it was brought to your attention, you might say to the annoyed person, ‘I’m 
sorry, but I wasn’t doing it intentionally.’  
To help explain Anscombe’s requirement that we be non-observationally 
aware of our intentional actions, consider one last example—we are non-
observationally aware of the position of our body parts. I do not have to look down to 
see if my knee is bent. I do not become aware that my knee is bent based on some 
tingling sensation being sent through my nervous system. I am aware that my knee 
is bent non-observationally. The awareness we have of our intentional actions is 
supposed to be similar. In standard cases, I do not need to observe my arm pumping 
in order to be aware of what I am doing. On Anscombe’s view, being non-
observationally aware of the things I am intentionally doing is just part of what it 
means to be doing something intentionally. That being said, we standardly do not 
have non-observational knowledge of contracting [such-and-such] muscles when we 
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are intentionally pumping our arms. If I had some sophisticated knowledge about 
human anatomy, I might be able to look down at my pumping arm and determine that 
[such-and-such] muscles were contracting. So it is possible for me to be aware of my 
activity at this level of description, but only after a bit of observation, which 
immediately exempts it from being classified as intentional. So how does all this 
apply to musical improvisation and improvisation in general?  
We can start to apply these Anscombian ideas to musical improvisation by 
thinking about the different ways we describe the actions we take to be improvised. 
Consider that both classical and jazz musicians usually plan to play [such-and-such] 
song. In standard cases, this is usually not considered an improvised activity. Playing 
[such-and-such] song is an action one usually plans in advance. Sometimes such a 
plan is made explicit by a setlist, written by a bandleader and agreed upon by his 
group. In the case of the classical musician, part of her plan to play [such-and-such] 
song involves plans to play [such-and-such] notes. Remember that on my account, 
actions that are planned in advance do no count as improvised actions. So playing 
[such-and-such] notes does not count as a description of an improvised activity for 
the classical musician, because, in standard cases, the classical musician has 
planned to play those notes in advance.  
With that being said, the same classical musician might not have included 
playing with [such-and-such] dynamics and rhythm in her plans to play [such-and-
such] song. So for a classical musician playing with [such-and-such] dynamics and 
rhythm may indeed count as a description of an improvised action. So on my 
account, Gould and Keaton appear to be somewhat vindicated. Musical performance 
does seem to essentially involve some set of improvised actions, at least under 
certain descriptions. What is missing from their account is a process for indentifying 
these actions. I have argued that this can be done by carefully attending to our 
action descriptions. Once we are clear about the specific action we have in mind, we 
can determine whether is falls inside or outside of my proposed definition. Actions 
like playing jazz music or playing classical music aren’t easily categorized as fully 
improvised or fully non-improvised. 
As for the jazz musician, he may only have a plan to play such-and-such 
song, without any plans to play [such-and-such] notes with [such-and-such] 
 Lepore 12 
dynamics and rhythm3. So, since the jazz musician does not plan out what notes he 
will play or how he will play them, we can say that he improvises these actions. The 
main difference between playing classical music and playing jazz music then is that 
playing jazz music involves the improvisation of a wider range of actions, again 
vindicating Gould and Keaton’s position that jazz and classical performances differ in 
degree rather than kind. The jazz musician can improvise melodies, rhythms and 
dynamics, while the classical musician is standardly restricted by the conventions of 
classical music from improvising new melodies. The classical musician is, however, 
allowed to improvise rhythms, dynamics and other subtle aspects of her 
performance.  
Are Improvised Actions Intentional? 
You may be wondering how closely the action description playing [such-and-such] 
notes parallels the action description contracting [such-and-such] muscles. The 
debate over this question amounts to the debate over whether improvising is an 
intentional action. That is, if playing notes is like contracting muscles, then playing 
notes is an unintentional action, in addition to being an improvised one. I tentatively 
suggest that the act of improvising seems like something someone does 
intentionally, as in the case where I know I am to take a solo after the second 
chorus4. In such a case, when the end of the second chorus comes, I have a plan to 
start improvising, and I proceed to improvise intentionally until the end of the section. 
From this we can observe something odd about my view: in cases when one plans to 
improvise in advance, improvising is not a description of an improvised action. 
Rather the improvised actions are the unplanned for subroutines that execute the 
plan to improvise, i.e. playing [such-and-such] notes, etc. 
In contrast to the intentional act of improvising, lower level descriptions of 
action like playing [such-and-such] notes, may not count as a description of an 
                                                
3 For the sake of argument, I am thinking here of a jazz piece that is totally improvised start to 
finish. Recently Keith Jarrett is perhaps most famous for performing this kind of totally 
improvised jazz. Jarrett is well known for his completely improvised concerts, which he 
performs often by himself, and sometimes with a trio – the later is an excellent display of what 
Bill Evans calls ‘collective coherent thinking’.  
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intentional action. This is because, like contracting [such-and-such] muscles, one 
may not have non-observational knowledge of what one is doing while one is playing 
[such-and-such] notes. In standard cases of improvising, the performer may know he 
is improvising, but does not necessarily know what notes he is playing. Many of the 
jazz musicians I have personally spoke with describe improvisation as something 
that happens in an altered state of mind. They report that when they improvise they 
feel like they are daydreaming, mediating, or under some kind of hypnosis. They 
report that the notes they play just come to them. In fact, when they try to attend too 
closely to the notes they are playing, they begin to make mistakes and fall out of 
rhythm. So on a first pass, certain actions, like playing [such-and-such] notes, are 
likely to be unintentional, in addition to being unplanned and improvised.  
A General Account of Improvisation  
As previously mentioned, on my account, actions need to be more than just 
unplanned if they are to count as improvised. They also need to be novel and 
performed within an improvisational framework. Since there are more opportunities 
to improvise in jazz performance, as we have just shown, we can say that the 
improvisational framework is wider in jazz than it is in classical performances, and 
thus playing jazz involves a higher degree of improvisation. A classical musician is 
afforded less freedom to improvise when compared to the freedom afforded to a jazz 
musician, and thus playing classical music involves a lower degree of improvisation. 
When freedom diminishes, so does the degree of improvisation. When our freedom 
becomes too abundant though, it might no longer make sense to say we are 
improvising either. 
 Additionally, according to my definition, the improvised parts of both classical 
and jazz performances must be novel actions. I include this constraint because an 
action that is unplanned but is a matter of routine should not count as improvised. 
For example, bringing my bow up to my instrument, is probably not part of any 
musicians plan to play [such-and-such] song. However, it is something that almost 
always happens when one executes a plan to play [such-and-such] song. It follows 
from this that bringing my bow up to my instrument is a description of a routine 
action, and thus it should not count as improvised. Now that we have all the 
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elements of my account out in the open, it is time to say a bit more about each, 
starting with the unplanned nature of improvised actions. 
When we make plans to do something in the future, they are usually plans to 
perform an action under a certain description. For example, I have a plan to ride the 
Metrolink tomorrow. My plan to ride the Metrolink tomorrow includes the planning of 
some subroutines, like packing my bag, making sure I have my wallet and Metrolink 
pass, driving my car to the station, parking etc. However, even with all of these 
subroutines planned, my plan remains incomplete. There are sub-subroutines that 
are unformulated, but nevertheless essential, parts of my plan. For example, 
executing my plan to drive my car to the station involves turning my car on, pressing 
the accelerator, steering the car, etc. I definitely do not explicitly plan to do some or 
all of these things when I make my plan to ride the Metrolink tomorrow. These 
unplanned aspects of my behavior are the ones most likely to be improvised. This 
idea was clearly expressed in my discussion of musical improvisation. A jazz 
musician might have a plan to play [such-and-such] song, without planning all the 
specific subroutines that are required in order to execute such a plan, i.e. plans to 
play [such-and-such] notes. The unplanned subroutines of an action plan are usually 
the actions that end up counting as improvised. 
The unplanned subroutines of my plan to ride the Metrolink do not 
necessarily count as improvised though. This is because my account requires 
improvised actions to be novel. Much like bringing my bow up the my instrument, the 
steps I take toward the Metrolink platform are a matter of routine. Riding the 
Metrolink is something I do almost every day and the steps I take to get there are 
almost the same day-in and day-out. The steps I take toward the Metrolink platform 
therefore are not novel actions. However, if I get to the Metrolink station and find a 
crime scene with police tape blocking the path I usually take toward the platform, I 
may be forced to take a new route towards where I want to be. These steps may 
then count as improvised. S what makes an action novel then? 
 Some readers may be worried that what counts as novel may be dependent 
on the audience5. For example, for some audiences, a stand-up comedians material 
                                                
5 Thanks to Brit Brogaard for this suggestion. 
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might be novel, in that they have never heard it before. On the other hand, the 
comedian’s tour manager has heard his routine a thousand times. The comedian’s 
material is definitely not novel for his tour manager. I want to try to eliminate this 
worry by defining novel in terms of the (mega)type/token distinction discussed by 
Alperson and others. We can say that a novel action is an action that is not an 
instantiation of an already existing megatype. So if a comedian is telling the same 
jokes night after night, his performances are not novel, because his routine 
instantiates an already existing megatype. If a comedian is working on new material 
based on suggestions from the audience or working with a group to create a totally 
new scene, like the players at Second City in Chicago do night after night, then these 
actions are novel.  
Again we saw this played out in the discussion of musical improvisation. 
Songs, like the various versions of “Johnny B, Goode”, which are repeated note for 
note night after night, are not improvised because they instantiate an already existing 
megatype. On the other hand, a concert performed by the award winning jazz 
pianist, Keith Jarrett is likely to be something that has never been heard before. Such 
a concert is novel, and if it is unplanned, should count as improvised. Consider how 
the novel and unplanned requirements of my definition work together. The very first 
full performance of a piece of classical music might be considered a novel action, in 
that it the specific melodies and harmonies that make up the piece had never been 
performed before. However, such a performance is not improvised, except in the way 
Gould and Keaton point out, because the players planned to play those notes in 
advance. So novel but planned actions are not improvised in the same way that 
unplanned but routine actions are not improvised. 
Here’s another worry: some actions, that are not necessarily novel, might 
indeed still be considered improvised. For example, a basketball team might practice 
a particular play during practice, and then five seasons later spontaneously use that 
play during a game6. Two possible responses to this worry present themselves. First, 
I might just hold my ground and say such a situation should not count as an 
improvised action, even though it was unplanned, because it was used in practice 
before and therefore is not novel. The other option, and the stronger response in my 
                                                
6 thanks to John Brunero for this counter example.  
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opinion, is to say that the two actions are actually different in important respects. For 
example, presumably the play was originally run in a carefully controlled practice 
environment. It was run based on orders from a coach trying to make his team 
better. The second instance of the play was run during the course of a game, in 
response to a unique situation not present during the practice five years ago. So 
while the product of the action might appear to be the same, the action undertaken is 
actually quite different and, in terms of my definition, novel. Readers might note the 
similarity of this response to Alperson’s response that a recording of an improvised 
performance might be replicated. The response turns on distinguishing between the 
two senses of ‘improvisation’, the action sense and the product sense. In the case of 
the replayed basketball play, the product may indeed be a reproduction, but the 
action is novel, and thus can still count as improvised. 
A final worry is that there might be actions that are both unplanned and novel 
that nevertheless should not be considered improvised. Here I have in mind certain 
random actions, like speaking in tongues, muscle spasms, slips of the tongue, and 
maybe certain musical performances like John Cages ‘4’33”’ (pronounced “four 
minutes, thirty-three seconds”). To account for this worry my definition of improvised 
action requires that improvised actions be performed within a well-defined 
improvisational framework. What I have in mind here is something like a limited 
range of possible options for behavior7. If there are too many options available to an 
agent, then the action might not be improvised. If there are too few options available 
to an agent, then too the action might not be improvised 
Take for example a case where the framework is too broad. John Cage’s 
‘4’33”’ is a good example of this kind of case. The piece is a conceptual work made 
up of three-movements of complete silence from the performer(s). The total time it 
takes to play the three movements adds up to four minutes and thirty-three seconds, 
hence the title. The music of the piece is supposed to consists of the ambient noise 
                                                
7 It might be possible to discuss the range of possible options for behavior in terms of the 
technical notion of ‘affordances’. I have explored this idea in previous drafts of this paper but 
have decided to refrain from using it in the final version. I abandon affordances in part 
because it has proven to be too controversial and/or confusing for some readers and giving a 
full defense of it would take too much time. Further, relying on the ordinary way we talk about 
‘options’ seems like it will suffice for present purposes. With that being said, I have not totally 
given up on the idea of using affordances in my account.  
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of the room in which the piece is being performed. The music is not a standard case 
of improvisation because the ambient noise in most rooms is almost totally 
random8—who could predict that some bird would chirp outside right at the beginning 
of the performance, or that the man in the sixth seat of the tenth row would cough 
lightly into his hand at the 1’45” mark, or that the man sitting eight rows behind him 
would shift in his squeaky seat as the piece concluded. The music produced by 
these actions is not improvised on my account, because it does not occur within a 
well-determined improvisational framework. They way ‘4’33”’ is set up, the piece 
could be performed during any 4’33” interval of time, at any place a conductor 
chooses. On this reading, the number of possible performances of the piece is near 
infinite. So, even if we agree that performances of 4’33” are unplanned and novel in 
the relevant ways, the content of the piece is randomly determined, and not rightly 
considered improvised. If the framework were to be constrained a bit more, as in 
standard cases of jazz performances, then the performance could be considered 
improvised. 
On the other hand, when a framework affords too few options, or even just 
one option, then actions performed within those frameworks are not improvised. 
Following a recipe is a good example of this. A recipe might call for 1 cup of sugar, 1 
cup of milk, 2 cups of flower, 1 egg, 3 tablespoons of butter, a tablespoon of baking 
powder and a pinch of salt. Putting this recipe together is obviously not a description 
of an improvised action, because there is not a sufficient degree of freedom available 
to the cook. They must use 1 cup of sugar, 2 cups of flower etc. Making an old family 
chili recipe might allow for more freedom and be closer to an improvised action. One 
can decide during the making of the recipe how much chili powder to use, depending 
on how spicy one likes their food. One might feel inspired to add some dark beer, a 
splash of bourbon, extra onion or bacon bits, depending on how one feels and what 
ingredients one has available. The chili cook is free to improviser, whereas the 
pancake cook has to stick to the recipe.  
When the framework opens up into a well-determined set of options, then one 
has the freedom to improvise within that framework. When the framework becomes 
                                                
8 In this example I am thinking about improvisation in the product sense, rather than the 
action sense, as it is not clear who the performers of the music are. This makes it difficult to 
speak coherently about the actions involved in the performance.  
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too broad, one is no longer improvising but acting randomly. When the framework 
becomes too narrow, one is no longer improvising but following a recipe. It is not 
clear where to set the boundaries between improvisation and recipe following and 
improvisation and random action. It might be that there are no truly random actions 
or totally planned/deliberate actions. It might be that all actions are, in some sense, 
improvised actions, and that random actions and planned actions are a kind of 
idealized action type. I don’t intend to defend this claim in this paper, but I do think it 
is worth pointing out here as a possibility to be further explored in later work.  
Conclusion 
To conclude I want to point out that a common form of human behavior is the 
following-- one establishes some goal, and makes some plans to achieve that goal, 
including the planning of some basic subroutines. At a certain point, with some 
subroutines and some sub-subroutines left unplanned, one begins acting toward that 
goal. The unplanned subroutines of one’s plan end up being improvised along the 
way. This is especially true of our behavior in new and unusual situations—think of 
MacGyver improvising his way out of a jail cell with nothing but a Swiss Army Knife 
and a roll of duct tape. In common every-day situations, like riding the Metrolink, the 
unplanned parts of the larger plan sometimes do not qualify as improvised because 
they are simply a matter of routine. To the extent that our lives have not become so 
routine that we find ourselves retracing our steps day-after-day, repeating the same 
old stories and ideas to the same tired people, we seem to improvise our way 
through a great deal of our waking life. On this view, improvising may be a symptom 
of an interesting life, devoid of boring repetitive routines.  
Charles Limb, the neuroscientist studying improvisation mentioned at the 
outset, has made some interesting discoveries about what is going on in the brain 
when we improvise. By comparing fMRI data collected from musicians improvising 
with fMRI data collected from musicians playing over-learned musical sequences, 
Limb has begun to uncover the neural correlates of improvised action (2008). I 
should point out now, that thanks to my view we can understand improvisation as the 
performance of an unplanned, novel action performed within some predetermined 
improvisational framework, as opposed to just the spontaneous performance of 
certain types of actions, as Limb originally has it. Now when we talk about Limb’s 
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findings, we can understand them in terms of my new definition, rather than the 
obscure terms his definition of improvisation is originally presented in. 
Limb has found that there is significant overlap in the areas of the brain active 
during musical improvisation with areas of the brain active during the creation of 
autobiographical narrative. Limb and his colleagues suggests this is consistent with 
views of improvised music playing as an expression of one’s ‘personal musical voice, 
viewpoint or story’ (2008). As if this were not interesting enough, Limb also suggests 
that the areas of the brain active during improvisation also overlap with areas of the 
brain thought to be involved in the neural instantiation of the self. Limb and his 
colleagues show that the areas of the brain active during improvisation overlap with 
brain areas associated with internally motivated, self-generated, and stimulus-
independent behaviors (2008). This overlap could have potentially interesting effects 
on how we understand the self and the source of human agency. Unfortunately I 
have not said much about the role of agency in improvisation, though it is sure to 
play a big role.  
Consider a case where someone performs an unplanned novel action, within 
a well-defined improvisational framework, but where the person’s body is controlled 
by some angelic presence. Such a case does not seem like a case of improvisation, 
even though it fits within the core requirements of my definition. So improvised 
actions need to originate from some source of agency belonging to the person who is 
said to improvise. Exactly how we should understand agency and its role in 
improvisation is a matter outside of the bounds of this paper. The project of 
understanding the role of agency in improvisation should be explored in future work 
on this subject.  
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